Irão: boas notícias (trazidas pelos amaricanos)

O novo estudo do National Intelligence Council, uma espécie de reunião plenária de todos os serviços de intelligence dos EUA, tem boas notícias (novidades) e algumas más notícias (que não são novidade).

Algumas passagens importantes - as boas notícias:

1. "We judge with high confidence that in fall 2003, Tehran halted its nuclear weapons program";

2. " we judge with high confidence that the halt... was directed primarily in response to increasing international srcutiny and pressure";

3."Tehran's decision to halt its nuclear weapons program suggests it is less determined to develop nuclear wepaons than we have been judging since 2005";

4. "Iran may be more vulnerable to influence on the issue than we judged previously";

5. "We judge with moderate confidence Iran probably would be technically capable of
producing enough HEU for a weapon sometime during the 2010-2015 time frame.
(INR judges Iran is unlikely to achieve this capability before 2013 because of
foreseeable technical and programmatic problems.) All agencies recognize the
possibility that this capability may not be attained until after 2015";

6."Our assessment that Iran halted the program in 2003 primarily in response to
international pressure indicates Tehran’s decisions are guided by a cost-benefit
approach rather than a rush to a weapon irrespective of the political, economic, and military costs. This, in turn, suggests that some combination of threats of intensified
international scrutiny and pressures, along with opportunities for Iran to achieve its
security, prestige, and goals for regional influence in other ways, might—if perceived
by Iran’s leaders as credible—prompt Tehran to extend the current halt to its nuclear
weapons program. It is difficult to specify what such a combination might be."

Agora as más:

1. "we also assess with moderate-to-high confidence that Tehran at a minimum is keeping open the option to develop nucelar weapons";

2. "We assess with moderate confidence that convincing the Iranian leadership to forgo
the eventual development of nuclear weapons will be difficult given the linkage many
within the leadership probably see between nuclear weapons development and Iran’s
key national security and foreign policy objectives, and given Iran’s considerable
effort from at least the late 1980s to 2003 to develop such weapons. In our judgment,
only an Iranian political decision to abandon a nuclear weapons objective would
plausibly keep Iran from eventually producing nuclear weapons—and such a decision
is inherently reversible";

3."Iranian entities are continuing to develop a range of technical capabilities that could
be applied to producing nuclear weapons, if a decision is made to do so. For example,
Iran’s civilian uranium enrichment program is continuing. We also assess with high
confidence that since fall 2003, Iran has been conducting research and development
projects with commercial and conventional military applications—some of which would
also be of limited use for nuclear weapons";

4."We assess with high confidence that Iran has the scientific, technical and industrial
capacity eventually to produce nuclear weapons if it decides to do so."

Como disse, as más notícias não acrescentam nada de novo, enquanto isolam os falcões que aparentemente andam "todos os dias" a exigir que se bombardeie o Irão. Portanto, isto tudo significa que a opção militar (sempre uma má ideia) está em vias de desaparecer do mainstream do debate americano.

Isto tudo também significa que a percepção da ameaça iraniana por parte da Europa - menos urgência, utilidade do processo diplomático, exclusão da opção militar - tem sido a correcta. (É bom não comparar o ocasional discurso ameaçador de Sarkozy com uma postura americana que considera há anos a opção militar como uma "solução" a ter em conta.)